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Informal punishment of non-cooperators 
 
Kimmo Eriksson 




at high levels due to the rise of altruistic punishers, that is, individuals who not only 
cooperate themselves but also informally punish non-cooperators. Strong reciprocity 
theory assumes that this punishment is costly to the punisher but beneficial to the group, 
that is, the punisher behaves altruistically. The theory further assumes that by engaging 
in this individually costly but group-beneficial behavior, punishers gain a good reputation. 
The aim of my dissertation is to critically examine the empirical validity of these 
assumptions through a series of experimental studies. Overall, I find that the assumptions 
of strong reciprocity theory are not supported. (1) Punishment of non-cooperators does 
QRWVHHPWREHGULYHQE\SXQLVKHUVKDYLQJWKHJURXS¶VLQWHUHVWDWKHDUW,QIDFW,ILQGWKDW
punishers in economic cooperative games tend not to be more cooperative than non-
punishers. Punishers also tend to punish both non-cooperators and cooperators. I 
conclude that punishers seem to be characterized by being generally punitive rather than 
being generally altruistic. (2) Punishers of non-cooperators do not seem to gain a good 
reputation in general. Rather, informal social norms about the use of punishment seem to 
restrict it more than encourage it. Moreover, people who face the choice of whether to 
punish a non-cooperator seem not to tend to think of punishing as the moral thing to do.  
My conclusion of these empirical results is that strong reciprocity theory paints an 
incorrect picture of the psychology of informal punishment of non-cooperators. I argue 
that this theory likely goes wrong already when it takes cooperative situations as its 
starting point, and that a better approach would be to assume that there is a more general 
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This is dissertation for a PhD in social psychology based on published works. I am originally a pure 
mathematician, trained at the Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden. I obtained a PhD in 1993 with 
a dissertation on algebraic combinatorics. I then extended my research interests to include stable 
matchings, a topic in the intersection between combinatorics and game theory. In 1999, I was 
appointed as a dean at Mälardalen University in Sweden. When I went back to research in 2003 I had 
somewhat lost touch with what was happening in algebraic combinatorics. I decided to focus on game 
theory instead. Specifically I was interested in the accuracy of game theoretic predictions of matching 
behavior (see Eriksson & Strimling, 2009). 
I soon found out that experimental work on behavior in games was already being conducted by 
behavioral economists across the world, although there was no dedicated laboratory for such 
experiments in Sweden. In order to create such a laboratory I joined forces with an economist, Martin 
Dufwenberg, and a sociologist, Peter Hedström. Our grant application was approved but both my co-
applicants were offered jobs at prestigious institutions abroad. I was left in charge of the grant despite 
having no experience in behavioral experiments whatsoever. To manage this challenge I asked my new 
PhD student in mathematics, Pontus Strimling, to join me in finding out how to set up a lab and how 
to conduct experiments. We turned out to be a good team. Pontus has been a valuable co-author on all 
the research I report in this dissertation as well as many articles not reported here. 
Before Peter Hedström moved to Oxford he organized a series of seminars in Stockholm that I 
attended. One talk was given by the experimental economist Simon Gächter, who presented joint work 
with Ernst Fehr on the public goods game. This is a game in which each member of a group decides 
how much money to contribute to a common pot. The total value of the common pot then grows by 
some multiplicative factor and is then distributed equally to all group members. High contributions 
are better for the group, but selfish individuals are tempted to make a low contribution. From earlier 
research on the public goods game, it was well-known that contributions to the pot tended to decline 
when the game was repeated several times. 7KHQRYHOW\RI)HKUDQG*lFKWHU¶s experiment was that 
RQFHHYHU\RQH¶V contributions were known, players were given the option to pay a small cost to reduce 
the payoff of any other player. This change in the game made contribution levels rise dramatically.  
I remember being impressed by these results²EXWQRWE\WKHUHVHDUFKHUV¶sweeping interpretation 
of them. First, they interpreted the public goods game as embodying the general concept of 
cooperation; specifically, cooperation was reduced to an individual behavior, namely, to make a large 
contribution to the common pot. Second, they interpreted their experimental results as showing that 
the reason humans cooperate better than other related species is that they punish those who do not 
cooperate. The behavior to punish low-contributors, termed altruistic punishment, was interpreted as 
a biologically determined strategy that had evolved because it enabled humans to cooperate better; in 
other words, the payoffs in the public goods game were interpreted as corresponding to fitness. 
My skeptical reaction was based on reflection on my own experience. For instance, as an amateur 
musician I enjoyed playing chamber music. Making music together seemed to me a prime example of 
human cooperation: the players make a joint effort in the creation of a good and the result depends 
crucially on every player doing his/her part. No good chamber music is made if one musician plays at 
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another tempo than the others, or in another key, or not at all.  Nonetheless, ensemble playing did not 
seem to fit the above framework. Amateur musicians choose to cooperate (i.e., do ensemble playing as 
well as they can) because it is its own reward, not because they are afraid of punishment from the other 
players. Moreover, if another player would yell at someone who plays the wrong note I would certainly 
not regard that as an altruistic behavior. And I really did not see how the rewards and costs associated 
with good ensemble playing would affect WKHSOD\HUV¶ fitness in an evolutionary sense. For that matter, 
I GLGQ¶WVHHKRZpublic goods game payoffs could reasonably be interpreted as fitness either. 
Over a number of years I conducted research on a variety of topics related to games and cultural 
evolution. My original doubts about the notion of altruistic punishers remained, but I did not address 
them directly in my research. A turning point came in 2011 when I went to the International 
Conference on Social Dilemmas and met the social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi. He demonstrated 
that skepticism of the notion of altruistic punishers could be the basis of interesting research. Since 
then I have conducted a number of studies in this direction. This dissertation is based on five papers of 
mine that, in various ways, question the notion of punishers as altruistic.   
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1 Review of the literature that has motivated my research 
The notion of altruistic punishment stems from the game theoretic approach to understanding 
human behavior. Game theory is a branch of mathematical modelling in which situations are 
represented by a set of players, each facing a choice between several strategies. The payoff to each 
agent is assumed to be determined by the combination of all their choices.  
 
1.1 Nash equilibria and social preferences 
Classic game theory makes the additional assumptions that (1) players make their choices to 
maximize their own payoff and (2) by some process they will arrive at a combination of choices such 
that no player can increase their payoff by unilaterally changing strategy. The strategy combinations 
referred to in the second assumption are called Nash equilibria. Thus, given a social situation where 
people care about what others do, classic game theory says that a researcher should model it by a 
game, that is, identify the strategies available to agents and identify the payoffs of every strategy 
combination. By calculating the Nash equilibria of that game, the researcher could then make 
predictions about how people will behave in the situation. 
In economic experiments in which people play games with monetary payoffs, observed behavior 
often does not amount to a Nash equilibrium. To try and salvage the Nash equilibrium as a predictive 
tool, behavioral economists tend to relax the assumption that all players are selfish, that is, that their 
aim is to maximize their own payoff. Some players are instead thought to be prosocial, that is, care 
also about that others get sufficient payoff.  
 
1.2 Social dilemmas and the game theoretic approach to cooperation 
A social dilemma is a game in which individual players face a choice between promoting their self-
interest (usually referred to as µGHIHFWLRQ¶and promoting the group-interest (usually referred to as 
µFRRSHUDWLRQ¶. In other words, in a social dilemma inGLYLGXDOVEHQHILWIURPRWKHUV¶FRRSHUDWLRQ but not 
from their own. The working assumption of many game theory oriented researchers of cooperation is 
that social dilemmas are good models of the value of, and hurdles for, successful real-life cooperation. 
Specifically, this model allows researchers to think of the value of cooperation as a sum of payoffs, 
while the hurdle for successful cooperation is simply the selfishness of agents. 
I want to emphasize that there are other ways to conceive of cooperation. For instance, the late 
British social psychologist Michael Argyle explicitly rejected the notion of cooperation as a game 
theoretic strategy. Instead he GHILQHGFRRSHUDWLRQDV³DFWLQJ together in a coordinated way at work, 
leisure or in social relationships, in the pursuit of shared goals, the enjoyment of the joint activity, or 
VLPSO\IXUWKHULQJUHODWLRQVKLS´$UJ\OH Moreover, lay-people have their own ideas about the 
hurdles for cooperation. In an unpublished on-line study I asked 100 US participants a checkbox 
question on which characteristics best describe someone who is difficult to cooperate with. Although 
many respondents characterized such a person as selfish there were several other responses that were 
equally frequent, including arrogant, ill-tempered, impatient, inflexible, and narrow-minded. These 
data suggest that real-life cooperation do not only require that people temper their selfishness, but also 
that they are able to communicate well and adapt their goals to circumstances.  
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Other problems with the game theoretic approach to cooperation will be discussed in section 3.1. 
 
1.2.1 The public goods game with punishment 
A great variety of different social dilemma games can be obtained from varying the number of 
players, the number of strategies they have access to, the payoffs, and whether moves are made 
simultaneously or sequentially. For the purpose of this dissertation it is sufficient to introduce the two 
games that play the most important roles in the literature on altruistic punishment. One of these is the 
public goods game (PG), which was mentioned in the preface. The PG has multiple (typically four) 
players. All players make simultaneous decisions on how to share their endowments between self and a 
common pot. The pot is then doubled in value by the experimenter (or multiplied by some other factor 
greater than 1 but less than the number of players). After this value increase the pot is distributed 
equally to all group members. This means that by contributing to the pot all players decrease their own 
payoff but increase WKHVXPRIDOOSOD\HUV¶SD\RIIVThus selfish players should contribute nothing 
whereas sufficiently prosocial players should contribute maximally.  
What makes the PG a social dilemma is that individual players can control their own contribution 
only. From the point of view of payoffs there is no tension between self-interest and group-interest 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRRWKHUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQV,f players instead had the power to make decisions for another 
player, both prosocial and selfish players should contribute maximally. Paper 1 in this dissertation 
describes such an experiment that yielded contributions at high but not maximal level²another 
indication of the limited predictive power of game theory.  
As I mentioned in the preface, Fehr and Gächter (2000) extended the PG with a second stage in 
which players may select other players (based on their contributions in the first stage) as the target of a 
payoff reduction. ,QRUGHUWRUHGXFHDQRWKHU¶VSD\RIISOD\HUVPXVWDFFHSWthat their own payoff is 
reduced too, although by a smaller amount (typically a third). Fehr and Gächter termed the use of such 
payoff reduction as ³DOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW´The logic behind the teUP³SXQLVKPHQW´LVWKDWLWLVDQDFW
WKDWKDVQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHWDUJHWRIWKHDFW7KHORJLFEHKLQGWKHWHUP³DOWUXLVWLF´is that 
although the punishment only has negative effects on payoffs in the short term, it may deter future 
defection and thereby maximize WKHJURXS¶VIXWXUHSD\RII; as such, it could be regarded as future-
oriented altruism, if altruism is defined as benefitting the group at a direct cost to oneself. Note that 
this is equivalent to the definition of the cooperative strategy in a social dilemma. (I think it is 
unfortunate that the terms altruism and cooperation are used as synonymous in this literature, and 
that neither usage is aligned with how these terms are used in other contexts.) 
 
1.2.2 The ultimatum game: another example of costly punishment 
The ultimatum game (UG) is a two-player game in two sequential moves. The first player, the 
proposer, decides on an offer of how to share an endowment with the other player, the responder. The 
responder then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. In case of rejection, the endowment is 
taken back by the experimenter. A selfish responder should therefore always accept any share greater 
than zero. Rejection of offers that are less than half but better than nothing has been interpreted as 
altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). The logic behind this interpretation is that offers of 
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less than half can be regarded as unfair, and rejection of unfair offers could be regarded as punishment  
of the proposer (as the proposer loses the endowment), which could deter future unfair behavior. Note 
that fairness in distributive decisions does not benefit the group in the sense that the total amount of 
resources increases. Nonetheless, the total utility derived from these resources may increase. To see 
this, consider food-sharing. The benefit to an individual of having more food than he or she needs is 
low compared to the benefit an individual who needs the food would gain from it. Thus, a fair 
redistribution of food may increase the benefits derived from the food. 
 
1.3 The strong reciprocity hypothesis of the evolution of human cooperation 
Papers on altruistic punishment in economic games have had great impact on the literature on 
cooperation. The reason is that economic games have been tied into a grand theory that incorporates 
both evolution and social norms. This theory is usually referred to as strong reciprocity (Fehr, 
Fischbacher & Gächter, 2002). It has been promoted in a series of papers and books by a collective of 
researchers, prominent members of which include Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Joe 
Henrich, and Robert Boyd. Strong reciprocity theory takes for granted that cooperation can be 
modeled as a social dilemma, that the costs and benefits of cooperation translate into biological 
fitness, and that the choice of behaving cooperatively or not is genetically determined. Under these 
assumptions, cooperation with strangers should not evolve because it would be outcompeted by selfish 
strategies. But, it is claimed, humans do cooperate with strangers at much higher levels than 
comparable animals. Hence there is an ³evolutionary puzzle RIKXPDQFRRSHUDWLRQ´. The solution 
offered is strong reciprocity, which means that people do not only cooperate with strangers, they also 
punish strangers for not cooperating. The strategy that combines cooperating with punishing non-
cooperators is referred to as an altruistic punisher strategy. The existence of the altruistic punisher 
strategy in a population changes the game such that selfish strategies are less successful. However, this 
solution creates a second-order question:K\LVQ¶WWKHDOWUXLVWLFSunisher strategy outcompeted by a 
non-punisher strategy? According to strong reciprocity theory, the solution is the same here: as 
altruistic punishment is a form of cooperation, non-punishers are punished too (e.g., Boyd, Gintis, 
Bowles & Richerson, 2003; Henrich & Boyd, 2001).  
 
1.4 The most important experimental studies of altruistic punishers 
There is a vast experimental literature on the ultimatum game and the public goods game. Here I 
discuss just a few papers that I consider to be the most important and relevant ones. A much richer 
treatment can be found in a rather recent volume on punishment in social dilemmas edited by Van 
Lange, Rockenbach, and Yamagishi (2014).  
 
1.4.1 Studies of targets of punishment in public goods game experiments 
In experiments on the public goods game the players choose whom to target with punishment. Thus 
there is no guarantee that it will be directed against those who contributed least to the common pot. 
Indeed, a study conducted in many countries found that in some countries punishment often targeted 
high contributors too (Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008). Consistent with a deterrent effect of 
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punishment, such ³DQWL-social punisKPHQW´ tended to lead to lower contributions. Thus, punishment 
can have both positive and negative effects on the group outcome.   
Another study around the same time examined the PG with punishment when it was extended by a 
second round in which the punished party could use counter-punishment against the punisher 
(Nikiforakis, 2008). The presence of counter-punishment eradicated the positive effect of punishment. 
Thus, positive effects of punishment seems to be contingent not only on which country you are 
experimenting in but also on a very specific design of the game.  
A related study used a second round of punishment in which any player (i.e., not just punished 
parties) could direct punishment at other players based on how they used punishment in the first 
round (Cinyabuguma, Page & Putterman, 2006). Even then, first round punishers received more, not 
less, second round punishment than first round non-punishers. This is an indication that strong 
reciprocity theory may be wrong about why people use costly punishment: It does not seem like using 
punishment makes you less likely to be punished by others.  
This conclusion was reinforced by a study that used both punishment and rewards as well as 
personality ratings (Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008). Punishers received more punishment and less rewards 
than non-punishers. Moreover, punishers were rated as less likable and less trustworthy than non-
punishers. 
Note that all these studies have been conducted in the context of economic games in laboratories. 
Ultimately the altruistic punisher hypothesis concerns human behavior in everyday life. There is work 
in social psychology studying informal punishment of norm violations in everyday life (e.g., Chaurand 
& Brauer, 2008). However, the question of how use of punishment is judged by observers has not been 
studied in that line of work. The work I present in Papers 2±4 focuses on this question.   
 
1.4.2 Studies examining whether ultimatum game rejection is altruistic punishment 
The conception of ultimatum game rejection as altruistic punishment has been examined in two 
studies by Yamagishi and colleagues. In one study the researchers modified the UG such that 
responders could only reject their own share but not affect the proposHU¶VVKDUH (Yamagishi et al., 
2009). Despite not being able to cause any harm to the proposer, rejections of unfair splits were still 
common in the experiment. This suggests that rejection of an unfair offer may be psychologically 
distinct from punishment. The researchers suggested that rejection is instead relatHGWRDVVHUWLQJRQH¶V
independence. 
In a later paper the same research group studied correlates of using rejection in the ultimatum 
game and obtained three important findings (Yamagishi et al., 2012). First, use of rejection was 
positively correlated with a measure of assertiveness, consistent with the motive suggested in the first 
study. Second, use of rejection in the UG was uncorrelated with DPHDVXUHRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
vengefulness, again suggesting that a desire for punishment was not the main driver of rejections. 
Third, use of rejection was uncorrelated with various helping behaviors in the domain of economic 
games, suggesting that rejection is not driven by an altruistic disposition. These findings are related to 




2 Summary of my research: questions, methods, results, and conclusions 
According to a recent review of strong reciprocity theory there is quite compelling evidence that 
QRUPVRIIDLUQHVVFDQXQGHUOLHSXQLVKPHQWDPRQJKXPDQVEXW³LWUHPDLQVFRQWHQWLRXVZhether this is 
DQDOWUXLVWLFFRQFHUQIRUWKHYDOXHVRIRQH¶VJURXS´:HQ]HO	2NLPRWRS The research in 
this dissertation consists of five papers that were all motivated by my doubts of the QRWLRQRI³altruistic 
SXQLVKPHQW´DQGLQYDULRXVZD\s they address this point of contention. Three big questions are 
addressed in this research: 
1. Those who punish selfish behavior are called altruistic punishers ± but are they altruistic? (Paper 
1.) 
2. What do social norms about punishment of selfish behavior look like? (Papers 2, 3, 4.) 
3. Do people think using altruistic punishment is the moral thing to do to? (Paper 5.) 
Each of these big questions can be broken down into several more specific questions. Below I 
describe the specific questions I have addressed in my papers, the methods that were used, and the 
results that were obtained. 
 
2.1 Those who punish selfish behavior are called altruistic punishers ± but are they 
altruistic?   
As outlined in section 1.4, the altruistic punisher in the strong reciprocity theory is a strategy in a 
social dilemma that combines cooperating with punishing non-cooperators. The empirical basis of this 
notion is that some participants in the public goods game pay a cost to punish non-cooperators. But to 
qualify as altruistic punishers, these participants should also be cooperators themselves and they 
should limit their punishment to non-cooperators. Do they? In Paper 1 (Eriksson, Cownden, Ehn & 
Strimling, 2014) we addressed these questions by reanalyzing the dataset from Herrmann et al.¶V 
(2008) 16-country study of 1,120 participants who played the public goods game in groups of four. 
Strong reciprocity theory in its most basic form views the altruistic punisher simply as a strategy 
and does not specify what makes an individual follow this strategy. One possibility is that altruistic 
punishers are simply motivated by the collective interest, both when they cooperate and when they 
punish. However, in the public goods game LWLVERWKLQWKHFROOHFWLYHLQWHUHVWDQGLQDSOD\HU¶VVHOILVK
interest that others cooperate. 7KXVDQRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWSXQLVKPHQWLVPRWLYDWHGE\SOD\HUV¶
selfish interest. To tease these motives apart we tweaked the game such that only the collective interest 
would be a motive to use punishment, whereas the selfish interest would motivate restraint on 
punishment. We conducted an experiment on this tweaked game, also reported in Paper 1. 
 
2.1.1 Do punishers of non-cooperators cooperate themselves?  
Method. We reanalyzed the data on the public goods game with and without punishment from 
Herrmann et al. (2008). In the condition without punishment ZHFRPSXWHGHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VWRWDO
contribution; this is our measure of cooperation. In the condition with punishment we computed the 
relative frequency with which each participant used opportunities to punish low contributors (those 
who made below-median contributions); this is our PHDVXUHRIXVHRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶. Within 
each group of four participants playing the public goods game we could then calculate the correlation 
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between cooperation DQGXVHRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶,ISXQLVKHUV of non-cooperators are 
cooperators themselves, these correlations should tend to be positive. 
Results. Contrary to WKHQRWLRQRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKHUV¶in strong reciprocity theory, the mean 
within-group FRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQFRRSHUDWLRQDQGXVHRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶Zas zero. A histogram 
(Fig. 1, left panel) clearly shows that the distribution of within-group correlations was symmetric 
around zero, illustrating the lack of a tendency for punishers of non-cooperators to be cooperators 
themselves. 
  
Figure 1. (Reproduced from Eriksson, Cownden, Ehn & Strimling, 2014). Distributions of the 
within-group correlations between individual use of punishment against low contributors and 
(left) individual contributions in condition without punishment, (right) use of punishment 
against high contributors. 
   
2.1.2 Do punishers of non-cooperators avoid punishing cooperators?  
Method. For every participant in Herrmann et al. (2008) we computed the relative frequencies with 
ZKLFKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWXVHGRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRSXQLVKORZFRQWULEXWRUVµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶DQG
opportunities to punish high contributors µDQWLVRFLDOSXQLVKPHQW¶. Within each group of four 
participants we could then compute the correlation between these two measures. According to the 
conception of altruistic punishers in strong reciprocity theory, IUHTXHQWXVHUVRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶
VKRXOGQRWEHIUHTXHQWXVHUVRIµDQWLVRFLDOSXQLVKPHQW¶. 
Results. &RQWUDU\WRWKHQRWLRQRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKHUV¶in strong reciprocity theory, the mean 
within-JURXSFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQXVHRIµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶DQGXVHRIµDQWLVRFLDOSXQLVKPHQW¶ZDV
positive. The histogram in the right panel of Fig. 1 shows how the distribution of correlations was 
clearly skewed towards positive values. 
 
2.1.3 Do punishers of non-cooperators use punishment in a way that promotes 
RWKHUV¶cooperative behavior even when it is not in their selfish interest to do 
so?  
Method. We conducted an economic experiment in which the standard public goods game, with and 
without punishment, was supplemented by the addition of conditions in which contributions were 
vicarious: each group member decided the contribution of the next one (cyclically). When 
contributions are vicarious, LWLVLQHDFKSOD\HU¶VVHOILVKLQWHUHVWWRGHWHUWKHYLFDULRXVGRQRUWRPDNH
high contributions on their behalf ± whereas it is in the collective interest to promote high 
contributions. Among those who in the standard game only ever used punishment against low 
FRQWULEXWRUVLHVHHPLQJO\SXUHµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKHUV¶ZHFRPSXWHGZKHWKHUWKH\XVHGSXQLVKPHQW
against high or low contributions made vicariously on their behalf. If punishment of non-cooperators 
12 
 
is motivated by desire to promote the collective interest, punishers should not tend to change their 
targets of punishment from low to high contributors only because it is no longer in their selfish interest 
to punish low contributions. 
Results. &RQWUDU\WRWKHQRWLRQRISXUHµDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKHUV¶EHLQJmotivated by the collective 
interest, most of them changed their targets of punishment when the setting changed to vicarious 
contributions. In other words, the majority punished their vicarious donor for making a high 
contribution on their behalf, thereby deterring cooperation in this game. 
 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
The results from these investigations point to a straightforward conclusion: participants who use 
µDOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW¶LQSXEOLFJRRGVJDPHH[SHULPHQWVGRQRWH[KLELW the other altruistic behaviors 
in the same domain that would be predicted by strong reciprocity theory. As reviewed earlier some 
research on altruistic punishment has used the ultimatum game instead of the public goods game, 
conceiving of rejection of low offers as a form of altruistic punishment. Also rejection of low offers in 
the ultimatum game is uncorrelated with various helping behaviors in economic games (Yamagishi et 
al., 2012). In sum it seems that results from experiments on economic games ± the very kind of data 
that initially motivated the altruistic punisher hypothesis ± do not support the notion that those who 
punish selfish behavior have altruistic motives. 
Of particular interest is the consistency with which participants used punishment across distinct 
situations: The same individuals tended to be the most frequent punishers of both high and low 
contributors, and of both voluntary and vicarious contributions. This consistency is remarkable given 
that the downstream effects of punishment on payoffs, to self and to others, tend to be positive in some 
situations and negative in others. Thus there seems to be an individual propensity to use or not use 
punishment, which is not particularly attuned to its downstream effects on payoff. 
In relation to everyday experiences this is not very surprising. We all know some people who seem 
to be generally more prone to angry confrontation than some other people we know. Nonetheless, it is 
bad news for the game theoretic approach to understand human behavior. The fundamental 
assumption of game theory is WKDWEHKDYLRUDOFKRLFHVFDQEHSUHGLFWHGIURPSHRSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHVRYHU
the likely consequences of their choices. ,ISHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRULVVKDSHGQRWVRPXFKE\WKHLUWKRXJKWV
about possible consequences as by unrelated emotions and habits, the fundamental assumption of 
game theory is invalid. It would be particularly problematic for evolutionary game theoretic models of 
cooperation. Such models rely on the assumption that the evolution of cooperative behavior can be 
studied within one specific strategic situation. If general proximate mechanisms, such as anger, 
influence punishment behavior across various situations, then the payoffs associated with any given 
situation cannot be used to model the evolution of punishment. 
 
2.2 What do social norms about punishment of non-cooperative behavior look like? 
Because of the group-beneficial consequences that punishment of selfish behavior may have, many 
scholars have regarded the provision of punishment as a public good in itself (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 
2001; Nakao & Machery, 2012; Yamagishi, 1986). Accordingly, the strong reciprocity theory count 
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non-punishers as non-cooperators that will be punished by the altruistic punishers, whereas punishers 
come into good standing in the group (Henrich & Boyd, 2001). Against this theoretical argument stand 
the experimental studies of public goods games that found that punishers were not socially rewarded 
relative to non-punishers (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008). This may not be so 
surprising, given our abovementioned findings of punishers not exhibiting any clear altruism. If other 
SHRSOHTXHVWLRQSXQLVKHUV¶DOWUXLVPLWVKRXOGPDNHWKHPOHVVLQFOLQHGWRUHZDUGSXQLVKHUV 
This tension in the literature led me to ask what social norms actually surround informal 
punishment of non-cooperators. In contrast to the lack of nuances in a typical game theoretic model, 
actual social norms must deal with the many subtleties in the social world. To begin with, individuals 
may have many different relations to each other: in the same group there may be both relatives and 
non-relatives, both superiors and underlings, both roommates and visitors, etc. A first question is 
whether the social norm is that anyone should punish someone who behaves selfishly, or whether the 
informal duty to do so is restricted to group members that have a special role in relation to the person 
who behaves selfishly (like a parent, a superior, or a roommate). 
The social world is also different to simple game models in that possible punishments range from 
extremely mild to extremely severe. Assuming a person in a certain role has the informal duty to 
punish someone else for behaving selfishly, do social norms restrict how mild or severe the punisher 
may be? 
Not all social structures involve special roles and relations. Some real-life situations are analogous 
to the public goods game experiments in that they involve a group of peers, that is, a group in which 
there are no relevant distinctions among its members. When there are no relevant distinctions 
between group members to guide who should punish someone who behaves selfishly, do social norms 
simply mandate any group member to be a punisher? Or is everyone discouraged from punishing? Or 
should the group members act as a collective?  
Moreover, the answers to these questions may depend on various factors. For instance, whereas 
economic laboratory experiments tend to focus only on monetary punishments, the social world offers 
a variety of kinds of punishment (e.g., yelling, fines, and beatings). Do norms about how peers may use 
punishment differ between different kinds? 
Individual variation should also be considered. As social norms are not explicitly spelled out and 
agreed upon, we should expect substantial variation between individuals in their social judgments of 
peer punishers. In particular, assuming that use of peer punishment is often motivated by anger rather 
than altruism (as we discussed at the end of the previous section), a more positive view of peer 
punishers could be found among people who are themselves high on trait aggression. 
 
2.2.1 When someone behaves selfishly, is the informal duty to punish restricted to 
people in certain special roles in relation to the target of punishment?   
Method. In Paper 2 (Eriksson, Strimling & Ehn, 2013, Study 2) we conducted an online survey of 
528 respondents across the world, recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com). The 
questionnaire presented three everyday scenarios involving someone behaving selfishly in a group 
whose members had different relations to the selfish person.  One scenario described two families 
dining together and discovering that one of the children has already eaten the sweets meant for 
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dessert. Another scenario described a hospital ward where one nurse is very late coming in to work, 
forcing the other nurses of various ranks to work extra hard. A third scenario described a student 
apartment where someone has made a mess in a common area to the annoyance of both a roommate 
and a visitor. (These situations were selected as everyday versions of three basic social dilemmas: 
depletion of a common resource, free-riding on a joint effort, and pollution of a common 
environment.) For each scenario, respondents judged how appropriate it would be for each group 
member to ³punish/reprimand´ the selfish person. 
Results. The relation between the selfish person and the punisher had a large effect on the 
appropriateness of using punishment. Specifically, it was generally viewed that the greedy child should 
be punished by its parent but not by a grownup in the other family; the late-coming nurse should be 
punished by the head nurse but not by a peer; the messy student should be punished by a roommate 
but not by a visitor.  The same pattern held in every geographical subsample, as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2. (Based on data from Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). How respondents from different 
geographical regions rated the appropriateness of different group members 
punishing/reprimanding someone who behaved selfishly. Ratings were averaged across the 
three scenarios described in section 2.2.1. 
 
2.2.2 Do social norms restrict how mild and how severe the punisher may be? 
Method. In Paper 3 (Strimling & Eriksson, 2014, Study 2) we conducted an online survey of 100 
respondents, 50 each from the United States and India. Respondents were presented with the same 
three scenarios as in the previous study and told to imagine that the child's parent, the head nurse, and 
the roommate, either did not reacted at all or punished the selfish person in the scenario in either of 
four different ways: (1) by explaining that the selfish behavior was wrong, (2) by explaining and yelling, 
(3) by explaining, yelling, and slapping, or (4) by explaining, yelling, slapping, and beating with a stick. 
For each reaction, respondents were asked how this would affect their view of the punisher: negatively 
(coded -1), neutrally (coded 0), or positively (coded +1). 
Results. Across scenarios the view of the punisher tended to be negatively affected if the punisher 
did not react at all, indicating the people in these special roles in these situations have an informal 
GXW\WRUHDFWZLWKVRPHNLQGRISXQLVKPHQW+RZHYHUDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQSHRSOH¶VYLHZRIWKH
punisher was obtained only when the punisher just explained that the selfish behavior was wrong. 
Yelling had no systematic effect, whereas the addition of physical punishments had a clear negative 
HIIHFWRQSHRSOH¶VYLHZRIWKHSXQLVKHU Thus it seems that social norms require a punisher to use as 
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mild a punishment as possible. Fig. 3 illustrates how these results held both among US and Indian 
participants.  
 
Figure 3. (Reproduced from Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). How respondents from the United 
States and India rated how use of different punishments would affect their view of a punisher 
with an informal duty to punish someone who behaved selfishly. Ratings were averaged across 
the three scenarios described in section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.3 Within a peer group, is it appropriate for a peer to punish another peer?  
Method. In Paper 3 (Strimling & Eriksson, 2014, Study 3) we conducted an online survey of 200 
respondents, 100 each from the United States and India. The three scenarios from the previous studies 
were adapted so that there were no relevant distinctions between group members, and such that every 
scenario described one peer did not punish and another peer who yelled about the selfish behavior. 
The decision to use yelling as punishment was based on the finding in the previous study that yelling 
tended to be judged neutrally when done by a preferred punisher in a group with non-peers. A fourth 
scenario instead presented a public goods game with one player using monetary punishment. For each 
scenario respondents compared the punisher against the non-punisher on seven items, on a five-point 
scale coded from -2 = definitely [the non-punisher] to 2 = definitely [the punisher]. The seven 
comparisons were: (1) you would prefer to spend time with; (2) most likely to punish people unfairly; 
(3) most likely to adhere to standard norms of behavior; (4) most likely to be an angry person; (5) most 
likely to take others' interests into account (6) most likely to create bad morale in the group; and (7) 
most trustworthy.  
Results. Results were remarkably consistent. The non-punisher was judged more favorably than the 
punisher on all items, across all four scenarios, and in both countries. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the two 
items showing the largest effect were that the punisher was most likely to be angry person whereas 




Figure 4. (Based on data from Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Mean ratings of a punisher 




2.2.4 Is it more appropriate for a peer group to punish as a collective? 
Method. In Paper 3 (Strimling & Eriksson, 2014, Study 4) we conducted a survey of 118 respondents 
from Sweden, the United States and India. A basic scenario was presented in which a group has a joint 
task that requires multiple meetings and one group member keeps coming late. The latecomer was 
punished by having to buy coffee to everyone in the group. This involved three steps: decision on the 
norm (that it is unacceptable to come late), decision on the punishment (that latecomers must buy 
coffee for everyone in the group), and execution of the punishment (ensuring that the latecomer buys 
coffee for everyone). In four variations of the scenario the first steps (between zero and three) were 
managed collectively by the group and the remaining steps were managed by a single group member 
called Eric. For each of the four variations of the basic scenario, respondents were asked to rate the 
DSSURSULDWHQHVVRI(ULF¶VEHKDYLRUDVZHOODVWKHJURXSVEHKDYLRURQDUesponse scale from -3 = 
definitely not OK to 3 = definitely OK).  
Results. All three countries showed the same pattern of results: When all punishment steps were 
managed collectively, both Eric and the group were judged to act appropriately. When the same 
punishment was managed singlehandedly by Eric, he was judged to act inappropriately. Intermediate 








Figure 5. (Based on data from Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Mean appropriateness ratings of 
the individual punisher Eric (left) and the group (right) depending on how many steps of the 
punishment were managed by the individual instead of the group.  
 
2.2.5 Are social norms about punishment of selfish behavior similar across different 
kinds of punishment? 
Method. In the previous studies we used written scenarios to study social norms about punishment 
of selfish behavior. In Paper 4 (Eriksson, Andersson & Strimling, 2016) we developed a method that 
uses animations instead. This method was inspired by the classic psychological research of Heider and 
Simmel (1944).  Using animations of triangles and circles, these researchers demonstrated that 
movements are sufficient to make viewers perceive abstract geometric shapes as having intentions, 
emotions, and social interaction. When I was exposed to this animation in a research seminar, it struck 
me how it could be advantageously used to study social judgment. Compared to written scenarios, 
geometric seem to offer several potential benefits. First, watching a scenario being played out rather 
than reading about it may make it more salient. Second, geometric shapes may be less susceptible to 
idiosyncratic associations than descriptions of human characters. Third, the weak reliance on language 
should make geometric animations suitable for cross-cultural and developmental studies. Compared to 
films of real human actors, geometric animations are also cheap and easy to make using readily 
available software. The animations can therefore be created in many variants to enable examination of 
the impact of various situational factors upon social judgments.  
In Paper 4 we created a basic animation of four 
triangles in different colors: blue, green, pink, and 
purple. The animation shows the triangles engaged in 
harvesting a resource, represented by a pile of circles. 
The triangles are strictly observing a sharing norm by 
taking turns at harvesting one circle at a time. 
Suddenly the purple triangle violates this norm by 
harvesting the entire remaining resource in one go. 
We created a large number of different continuations 
to this basic animation. One variant shows the other 
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triangles noting that the resource has been harvested in its entirety but not 
doing anything about it. In all other variants the blue triangle seeks out the 
purple triangle and engages in some kind of punishment. The main aim of the 
study was to examine how social judgments of this peer punisher varied with 
the details of the punishment, and whether there was any way punishment 
could be executed to make the peer  punisher judged more positively than a non-punisher.  
We created animations that depicted various kinds of punishment: physical aggression (e.g., a 
shove), economic punishment (taking back resources from the purple triangle), and yelling 
(represented by an exclamation mark in a speech bubble).  
In a conceptual replication of the findings from Paper 3, the animations of physical aggression and 
economic punishment each came in four versions that varied the severity of the punishment (a non-
harming shove vs. a damaging blow, or taking back some vs. taking back all of resources), and 
independently varied whether the punishment was individually or collectively managed (i.e., whether 
the blue triangle acted alone or in concert with the green and pink triangles).  
Each animation was judged by at least 100 American participants recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. The physical aggression animations were also judged by a total of 162 Swedish 
university students. Each participant watched only one version of the animation and rated the 
triangles on a number of items. The focus was on the blue triangle, which was rated on eight items: (1) 
,WKLQNWKH%/8(WULDQJOH¶VEHKDYLRUwas appropriate. (2) I would like to spend time with a person who 
behaves like the BLUE triangle. (3) [reverse-coded] If a person who behaves like the BLUE triangle 
belonged to my group I would consider that person to be a problem, rather than an asset, for the 
group. (4) I think BLUE is someone who (a) is generally trustworthy, (b) [reverse-coded] is generally 
angry, (c) takes otKHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQWRDFFRXQW, (d) [reverse-coded] would punish others unfairly, (e) 
generally follows standard norms of behavior. Responses were z-score transformed and averaged to a 
punisher approval index of high internal consistency. Participants also completed a trait aggression 
scale (Bryant & Smith, 2001). 
Results. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the study of US participants replicated the findings of Paper 3: 
First, peer punishment consistently gained worse approval ratings than non-punishment. Second, 
individually managed punishment gained worse approval ratings than when the same punishment was 
collectively managed. Third, more severe punishment gained worse approval ratings than milder 
punishment. Importantly, these patterns held across physical aggression and economic punishment. 
Moreover, individual differences were found: the approval of non-punishment and the disapproval of 
peer punishment were particularly apparent among participants who scored low on trait aggression. 







Figure 6. (Based on data from Eriksson et al., 2016). Mean punisher approval among US 
participants who watched animations where a selfish behavior was met with physical 




Figure 7. (Based on data from Eriksson et al., 2016). Mean punisher approval (as in Fig. 6) 
among participants that scored either low (blue bars) or high (black bars) on trait aggression 




These studies set out to answer the question what social norms about punishment of selfish 
behavior look like. The gist of the answers we obtained is that these social norms seem to be mainly 




have a very special role in relation to that person. Even then you can only choose punishment within a 
narrow range. Preferably, you should just explain to the selfish person that his or her behavior was 
wrong, ideally without even raising your voice and certainly not behaving aggressively.  
When there are no special roles ± a group of peers ± our studies showed that individuals who take it 
upon themselves to punish a selfish group member tend to be judged as acting less appropriately than 
those who do not punish. The preferred alternative is for the group to manage punishment as a 
collective. Indeed, in her field studies of cooperation with respect to common pool resources, Ostrom 
IRXQGWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWies were typically restricted to monitoring whereas 
sanctions of non-cooperation were collectively managed.  
A number of negative traits were also attributed to the punishers, such as being angry and likely to 
use punishment unfairly and create bad morale in the group. These attributions testify both to 
punishment being viewed as aggression and the negative consequences for the group that aggressive 
members are seen to have. Our findings of moderators of the disapproval of peer punishers give 
further support of the role of perceived aggressiveness. First, more aggressive raters tended to show 
less disapproval of peer punishment. Second, more severe punishments tended to be more 
disapproved of. Third, punishment that were directly aggressive but not harmful tended to be more 
disapproved of than punishment that were economically clearly harmful but not directly aggressive. It 
seems fair to conclude that dislike of aggressive group members is a major reason why use of 
confrontational peer punishment tends to have negative reputational effects.  
These findings stand in stark contrast to the notion of punishment as a public good in itself. While 
peer punishment has the potential for benefitting the community by ensuring that people adhere to 
cooperative norms, it also has undeniable harmful effects. These harmful effects may subjectively 
overwhelm the beneficial effects. Whether they do so also objectively is another matter. Outside the 
laboratory it is unclear whether costs and benefits could even be measured, and extremely unclear 
whether they could then be compared in a meaningful way. 
The results of our studies were remarkably constant across different scenarios and different 
countries. The possibility of human universals in norms regulating punishment is intriguing and 
warrants further study.  
A concluding remark is that people do not disapprove of punishment in general. Political parties 
promising to enforce laws that punish wrongdoers tend to be popular. There is no popular demand for 
abolishing all punishment from the criminal code. In short, formal punishment is generally approved 
of. It is an important question what peer punishers can do to gain more approval for their actions. 
 
2.3 Do people think using altruistic punishment is the moral thing to do to? 
A third topic motivated by the altruistic punisher hypothesis is how people judge the moral status of 
costly punishment. 7KHWHUP³DOWUXLVWLFSXQLVKPHQW´VXJJHVWVLWVKRXOGEH seen as a moral act. It is 
theoretically possible that costly peer punishment could still be seen a moral act even though we have 
found that it tends to be socially disapproved of. An example of the possibility of tension between 
morality and social approval is whistleblowing on corrupt practices in your organization, which is 
typically done out of moral duty in the face of harsh social sanctions from your colleagues (e.g., 
Dasgupta & Kesharwani, 2010). It is therefore relevant to study the morality of using costly 
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punishment in those economic games that have provided the main empirical basis of the altruistic 
punisher hypothesis: the public goods game and the ultimatum game.  
In the literature on the public goods game, decisions to pay a cost to reduce a low-FRQWULEXWRU¶V
payoff have been conceived of as altruistic punishment. In the literature on the ultimatum game, 
decisions to reject an unfair offer have been conceived of as altruistic punishment. What the two 
decisions have in common is that they make both the decision-maker and another player (who has 
behaved selfishly) worse off. However, there are also notable differences between the decisions. One 
difference is who were harmed by the selfish behavior: in the public goods game it is an entire group, 
in the ultimatum game it is only the decision-maker. This is potentially important in that having an 
other-regarding disposition should be more important for the decision in the public goods game than 
in the ultimatum game. (But recall from Paper 1 that we did not find altruistic punishers in the public 
goods game to be very other-regarding either.)  
Here we shall focus on another difference on which previous literature has been mute: the costly 
punishment decision is framed in different ways in the two games. In the public goods game the 
decision is explicitly framed as paying a cost to reduce WKHRWKHU¶VSD\RIID³UHGXFWLRQ´IUDPH,QWKH
XOWLPDWXPJDPHWKHGHFLVLRQLVLQVWHDGIUDPHGDVUHMHFWLQJDQXQIDLURIIHUD³UHMHFWLRQ´IUDPH
Indeed, the ultimatum game was originally introduced as a tool for the study of bargaining and the 
original paper made no mention of interpreting rejection as punishment (Güth et al., 1982). Thus, it is 
not clear that participants in the ultimatum game will process the decision about whether to reject as a 
decision about whether to punish. Participants could have other motives for using rejection, such as 
achieving fairness or asserting independence (Yamagishi et al., 2009).  
In Paper 5 (Eriksson, Strimling, Andersson & Lindholm, 2017) we posed two questions and 
examined whether the answers depended on if costly punishment in the ultimatum game was framed 
as rejection or as reduction. First, to what extent is rejection/reduction seen as punishment? Second, 
to what extent is rejection/reduction seen as the moral choice?  
2.3.1 To what extent is rejection/reduction seen as punishment? 
Method. In Paper 5 (Exp. 4) we conducted a simple online survey in which an ultimatum game 
scenario was described, with two different versions of the last two sentences: 
Consider the following situation. Two people, anonymous to each other, take part in an on-line 
H[SHULPHQW2QHRIWKHWZRSDUWLFLSDQWVLVQDPHG³SURSRVHU´DQGWKHRWKHULVQDPHG³UHFHLYHU´7KH
proposer is asked to make an offer about how to split 100 dollars between them, without any work 
required. This particular proposer's decision is to offer the receiver a share of 25 dollars (thus keeping 75 
dollars for himself/herself).  
 
Rejection version: The receiver is now given the option to accept or reject this offer. If the offer is rejected 
neither participant receives any money. 
 
Reduction version: The receiver is now given the option to pay the 25 dollars he/she has earned in the 
H[SHULPHQWWRUHGXFHWKHRWKHU¶VSD\RIIE\WKUHHWLPHVDVPXFK7KXVWKHSURSRVHUZRXOGWKHQORVHWKH
75 dollars he/she earned in the experiment. 
 
The survey was taken by 200 US participants, half of which were assigned to each version. Participants 
in both conditions answered the same multiple-choice question on how they would interpret someone 
using rejection/reduction. There were four responses to choose from: the receiver is angry at the 
proposer and makes this decision to punish him/her (coded as Punishment); the receiver prefers a fair 
outcome to an unfair outcome (coded as Fairness); the receiver dislikes having the outcome decided by 
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another and wants to assert his/her independence (coded as Independence); the receiver has another 
motive than any of the above (coded as Other).  
Results. The punishment interpretation was common for reduction (66%), but much less common 
for rejection (37%). See the left panel of Fig. 8. 
 
Figure 8. (Based on data from Eriksson et al., 2017). Proportion of participants who 
interpreted rejection/reduction as punishment (left), and mean moral judgment (right). Error 
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line indicate the neutral moral judgment.  
 
2.3.2 To what extent is rejection/reduction seen as the moral choice? 
Method. Our next study (Exp. 5) used the same stimuli and sample size as the previous one, but 
asked participants what would be the morally right thing for them to do if they were the second player 
in the scenario. Responses were given on a five-point scale, where 1 represented that use of 
rejection/reduction is definitely not the morally right thing to do, and 5 represented that use of 
rejection/reduction is definitely the morally right thing to do. 
Results. The median moral judgment of rejection was 3, that is, neutral. The median moral 
judgment of reduction was 2, that is, not moral. See the right panel of Fig. 8. 
 
2.3.3 To what extent are punishment or morality the motives for using and not using 
rejection/reduction? 
Method. In Exp. 1-2 we examined the questions of how rejection and reduction relate to 
punishment and morality in another way: by having participants making decisions in the role of the 
second player and then asking them to motivate their decision. Exp. 1 used hypothetical decisions and 
a large sample (N=400). Exp. 2 replicated Exp. 1 with a smaller sample (N=168) in an incentivized 
actual game conducted online. The decision they had to make was the same as the one described in the 
scenarios in the previous studies, again framed as either rejection or reduction.  
Results. As results were very similar between the hypothetical and incentivized experiment I here 
present the pooled data. The frequency with which a moral motive was invoked showed a remarkable 
pattern. Whereas nobody invoked a moral motive for using reduction, it was rather common (28%) to 
invoke a moral motive for not using reduction. In the rejection frame, the moral motive was essentially 
absent altogether. These results are consistent with the findings in the previous study of negative 
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moral judgments of reduction and neutral morals judgment of rejection. Consistent with moral 
concerns about reduction it was used substantially less than rejection, see the left panel of Fig. 9. A 
punitive motive was more common for using reduction than for using rejection, see the right panel of 
Fig. 9. This is consistent with the above finding that reduction is more likely to be interpreted as 
punishment. 
  
Figure 9. (Based on data from Eriksson et al., 2017). The proportion of participants who used 
rejection/reduction (left) and, among those who used it, the proportion who invoked a 
punitive motive (right). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
The results of these experiments indicate that the term altruistic punishment for rejection of unfair 
offers in the ultimatum game is a misnomer. For one thing, we would expect altruism to be associated 
with morality; however, we found little moral motivation for using rejection, and moral judgments of 
rejection were on average neutral. For another, the association between rejection and punishment is 
doubtful; rejection was typically not interpreted as punishment and the most common motive to use it 
was not to punish but to achieve a fair outcome. Indeed, it is a fallacy to assume that because an act 
has a certain consequence, that consequence was the reason for the act. Data on rejections in the 
ultimatum game may be a poor basis for psychological theories of punishment. 
We also examined the same decision when it was framed explicitly as whether to reduce payoffs 
instead of whether to reject the unfair offer. In contrast to rejection, reduction was strongly associated 
with punishment. At the same time its association with moral behavior was negative. Thus, whereas 
rejection tended to be viewed neither as morally charged nor as punishment, reduction tended to be 
viewed as immoral punishment. This is not surprising from the perspective of moral psychology, as 
causing harm is a key trigger of negative moral judgment. Presumably, framing the decision as 
rejection instead of reduction makes the causing of harm less salient as it may now be perceived just as 
a side effect. 
The framing effect was substantial also on behavior: use of rejection was almost twice as frequent as 
use of reduction, despite payoff consequences being identical. Such framing effects cannot be 
accounted for within the game theoretic paradigm, in which behavior is studied as an outcome of the 
game structure. Our finding is consistent with framing effects documented in previous research on the 
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ultimatum game (Larrick & Blount, 1997) and the dictator game (DeScioli & Krishna, 2013). What 
makes our finding stand out is that both the frames we used were already established as standard in 
the literature; we just transferred the reduction framing from the public goods game to the ultimatum 
game. For this reason, our finding calls into question whether it is at all worthwhile to strive for 
neutral language instead of purposefully inducing a frame (see also Eriksson & Strimling, 2014). 
 
3 Theoretical integration 
The empirical results I have summarized above strongly suggest that strong reciprocity theory 
paints an incorrect picture of the psychology of informal punishment of non-cooperators. This calls for 
an analysis of what is the fundamental problem with strong reciprocity theory. Here I will argue that 
the fundamental problem lies in the assumption that behaviors evolve specifically for cooperative 
situations (i.e., social dilemmas). I think it is more correct to assume that the psychology of informal 
punishment looks essentially the same across situations, regardless of whether or not they are of a 
social dilemma character. I conclude by sketching what a theory of informal punishment could look 
like and what kind of empirical questions such a theory would raise. 
 
3.1 Where strong reciprocity theory goes wrong: the tacit assumption of game 
theoretic cognition 
The general theory of evolution is based on replicators, that is, functional units that if they confer 
an advantage will spread in a population. Strong reciprocity theory is based on the notion that the 
VWUDWHJ\³FRRSHUDWHDQGSXQLVKDQ\RQHZKRGRHVQRWFRRSHUDWH´LVVXFKDIXQFWLRQDOUHSOLFating unit. 
This notion makes perfect sense within the context of a game theoretic model of a social dilemma. But 
as humans do not live in the game theoretic model it is necessary to ask whether it makes sense to 
consider such a strategy as a functional replicating unit also in the real world of humans. A 
characteristic of the real world is that individuals encounter a myriad of situations, varying along many 
dimensions and none of them exactly identical to another. The above specification of the altruistic 
punisher strategy is therefore incomplete, because it also requires a preprocessing component for 
deciding whether the current situation is a social dilemma. I will refer to such a preprocessing 
component as game theoretic cognition. When game theoretic cognition is included in the 
specification the strategy could be expressed: ³UHDGRIIWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQLILWLVDVRFLDOGLOHPPD
cooperate and punish anyRQHZKRGRHVQRWFRRSHUDWH´ 
Evolutionary game theory models of animal behavior, such as birds fighting over a resource, do not 
rely on animals having game theoretic cognition but on recognition of a particular situation (e.g., that 
this is a fight over a resource) in which strategies are activated. Humans, however, encounter a very 
large malleable set of different situations and have a large and malleable repertoire of behavioral 
responses. For example, vaccination against measles can be seen as a social dilemma: it is very 
effective in preventing the disease but it comes with a little pain and takes a little effort, and if 
everyone else got vaccinated then you would be protected anyway. But vaccination has only been 
encountered in modern times, so it is unthinkable that humans would have evolved strategies 
specifically for this situation. Thus, strong reciprocity theory requires people to be equipped with the 
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game theoretic cognition to recognize vaccination as belonging to the category of situations in which 
altruistic punishment should be activated. 
In a paper introducing functional interdependence theory, Balliet et al. (2016) noted that 
interdependence properties of situations (i.e., their game structure) are not readily observable and 
argued that humans should be equipped with adaptations for integrating relevant cues in order to 
produce accurate inferences about these situational properties. In my terminology, these authors 
argued that humans have game theoretic cognition. Their arguments centered on that such cognition 
would have been adaptive for our ancestors. However, it is not very meaningful to discuss the 
adaptiveness of a hypothetical trait. We need the trait in front of us to examine how it may be an 
adaptation. I think there is converging evidence for the absence of evolved modules amounting to 
game theoretic cognition. Specifically, it seems misleading to model people as wired with a set of 
strategies that are selectively activated on the basis of the game theoretic structure of the situations 
they encounter.  
Some evidence come from cursory observations. For instance, if people had game theoretic 
cognition it seems weird that behavioral economists feel obliged to spend so much effort to make sure 
participants understand a game (e.g., by presenting instructions in writing as well as reading them out 
aloud, followed by various control questions). After all, compared to naturally occurring situations like 
vaccination, the experimental games are extremely unambiguous when it comes to the player set, the 
strategy set, and the payoffs. If people find it difficult to grasp even such explicitly presented games, 
how could they possibly be accurate at recognizing the game structure of naturally occurring 
situations? Another observation is that there seem to be no concepts in common language for abstract 
game theoretic structures such as social dilemmas. The term ³free-riding´ is sometimes used 
metaphorically (i.e., creating a correspondence between different situations by giving the same name 
to a behavior in one situation as to a corresponding behavior in another situation), but this usage 
seems to have originated among economists and is less than a hundred years old 
(http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.se/2014/10/more-on-origins-of-free-rider-idea.html). By 
contrast, all languages seem to have plenty of common words for personal qualities (e.g., courage, 
anger, wisdom, and power) and relations (e.g., family, friend, and foe) that transcend game theoretic 
structures. 
More rigorous pieces of evidence come from papers in this dissertation. In Paper 1 we saw that the 
same individuals often use the same kind of costly punishment behavior across different situations: 
when someone made a low contribution, when someone made a high contribution, and when someone 
PDGHFRQWULEXWLRQVRQWKHSXQLVKHU¶VEHKDOI. Thus, use of costly punishment does not seem to be 
triggered by a specific game theoretic structure of the situation. 
In Paper 5 we found that use of costly punishment in the ultimatum game depended on whether it 
was framed as rejection or reduction. This finding adds to a large body of research on framing that was 
pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In brief, it is well-established that in situations where the 
game structure is made perfectly explicit, behavior is nonetheless very sensitive to cues that do not 
change the game structure.  
Some unpublished data provide further evidence for the absence of game theoretic cognition. My 
colleagues and I have used online surveys to document that people do not see social dilemmas as 
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researchers do (de Barra, Strimling & Eriksson, submitted). Specifically, we presented participants 
with a number of situations that researchers generally consider to be social dilemmas (e.g., whether to 
use a face mask when you have a cold, whether to drive to work in your own car or using slower public 
WUDQVSRUWRUFDUSRROLQJDQGZKHWKHUWRMRLQWKHDUP\DQGSURWHFWWKHQDWLRQ¶VVHFXULW\RUOHDYHLWWR
others). The game theoretic structure of social dilemmas is such that you should prefer to defect 
regardless what others do, and you should prefer that others cooperate. However, that was not a 
common response pattern when we asked our participants for their preferences. Instead, the majority 
of respondents expressed a fixed preference for their own behavior ± either to cooperate regardless of 
what others do or to defect regardless of what others do ± and they preferred other people would 
behave the way they did, regardless if that was to cooperate or to defect. In other words, our data 
suggest that people do not evaluate behavior in terms of some objective payoffs to themselves and 
other people. Instead they tend to view the behavior they use themselves as morally superior. 
In another working paper (Strimling, Bondesson & Eriksson, in preparation) my colleagues and I 
investigate social dilemmas and peer punishment in the earliest laws. Social dilemmas, in the sense of 
crimes committed against the group rather than against a specific individual, are almost completely 
absent in these laws. This is an indication that, historically, people have not easily recognized the 
importance of social dilemmas. 
In sum, the evidence seem to be against the existence of game theoretic cognition, which in turn 
seems to invalidate strong reciprocity theory and similar evolutionary game theory based approaches 
to human cooperation. 
 
3.2 A general theoretical model of disapproval and informal punishment 
A key observation is that informal punishment is not used only in connection to social dilemmas; in 
fact, from everyday experience it seems that almost any behavior could be the object of informal 
punishment. In many cases this has been documented by researchers on social norms; let me just 
mention sociologist Norbert Elias and social psychologist Robert Cialdini as two researchers who have 
carried out influential empirical work on this topic. Here I will sketch a new theoretical model of 
disapproval and informal punishment, built on a few fundamental principles. First, the object of 
LQWHUHVWLVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSURFessing of a situation and how it may result in a reaction that amounts to 
informal punishment (in contrast to a focus on evolved strategies or on social norms). Second, this 
processing and reaction can be analyzed as a sequence of judgments and decisions (each of which may 
be either automatic or deliberated on); this sequence is assumed to hold across individuals, but 
individual differences will play a crucial role for the results of these judgments and decisions. Third, 
the same framework should apply very generally. In particular, it should apply also to its own results, 
WKDWLVWKHIUDPHZRUNVKRXOGGHVFULEHDOVRKRZVRPHRQH¶VXVHRILQIRUPDOSXQLVKPHQWLVSURFHVVHG
and reacted to by other actors. The model I propose involves a sequence of steps outlined below and is 
summarized in Fig. 10. It can be seen as an extension and refinement of the framework of Chaurand 
and Brauer (2008), which outlines three factors (hostile emotions, responsibility, and legitimacy) that 



























Figure 10. A model of disapproval and informal punishment.  
 
3.2.1 Step 1: Interpretation of behavior and experience of emotional response 
As a general scenario, consider agent X learning of agent Y doing behavior B (e.g., X and Y could be 
a married couple and the behavior could be putting the toothpaste tube back into its designated cup 
with the tube cap pointing down instead of up²something Y tends to do and X tends to dislike). X 
FRXOGOHDUQRI<¶VEHKDYLRULQYDULRXVZD\VLQFOXGLQJGLUHFWREVHUYDWLRQVRPHRQHHOVH¶VDFFRXQWRI
what happened, and inference (say, from finding the toothpaste tube pointing the wrong way). In any 
case, X interprets the information to form a mental model of what happened (likely including the 
attribution of certain intentions and beliefs to Y) and experiences an emotional response to what 
happened. ,WKLQN;¶VXVHRILQIRUPDOSXQLVKPHQWFUXFLDOO\UHOLHVon the interpretation and emotional 
UHVSRQVHRI<¶VEHKDYLRU,QSDUWLFXODU,WKLQNLWLVH[WUHPHO\UDUHWKDWSHRSOHXVHLQIRUPDOSXQLVKPHQW
against a behavior they feel positive about, that is, approve of (whereas people with formal authority 
may be formally required to punish a behavior regardless of whether they approve of it), even if they 
know that many other people feel negative about it.  
A key factor, for which individual variation is generally ignored in game theory based research, is 
;¶Vbaseline preference for or against B. People simply dislike different things. For example, this was 
evident in Paper 4, where we found less aggressive participants to be more disapproving of an agent 
who acted aggressively against a selfish agent (see Fig. 7). To understand patterns of use of informal 
punishment in a certain domain, I think the first thing to understand is how preferences are 
distributed. 
Several additional factors will contribute to the emotional response, and there will be literatures on 
each of these factors to draw on. I do not delve into this literature here, as my aim is only to sketch the 
kind of framework I think would be useful for understanding informal punishment.  
If A seems 













 Is A an appropriate reaction to Y¶s behavior? 
 Is X in an appropriate position to do A? 













If A passes the evaluation 
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 Some factors relate to Y, such as ;¶VDWWLWXGHWR<; if you already dislike someone you may 
disapprove of his or her behaving in a way that would be tolerable behavior from someone else. 
Another such factor is ;¶VDWWULEXWLRQRI<¶VLQWHQW; if you believe an otherwise bad behavior was for a 
good cause you may condone it. 
Other factors have nothing to do with Y, such as ;¶VVWDWH; if you are already irritated, stressed, 
hungry, in pain, etc., you may disapprove of a behavior that you generally tolerate. Another factor is 
;¶VMXGJPHQWRIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVLQVWDQFHRI% The same behavior may be seen to have worse 
consequences in a certain context and therefore earn more disapproval. An extreme case of this was 
displayed in Paper 1, where we changed the public goods game such that the negative consequences of 
WKHDFWRI³contributing to the common pot´ moved from the contributor to another player, who then 
tended to disapprove more of such contributions. 
 
3.2.2 Step 2: Come up with an idea for how to act 
Assuming that X disapproves sufficiently RI<¶VEHKDYLRU to do something about it, there are 
generally a wide range of options available (in contrast to economic experiments, where there is 
usually only the choice of whether to reduce payoffs). The following list covers some common options. 
x Demand remorse, and possibly compensation, from Y. The kind of punishment that is available 
in economic experiments amounts to a fine, i.e., to removing some resource from the other. 
Papers 3 and 4 indicate that it may not be an acceptable reaction. In real-life situations I think it 
is not very common that the option of a fine is available, but very common that you demand an 
apology and perhaps a compensation, either substantial or symbolic. 
x Lash out physically at Y. Physical aggression was typically rated as an unacceptable reaction to 
selfish behavior in our studies in Papers 3 and 4. It is likely to be more acceptable as a reaction 
WRDQRWKHU¶VSK\VLFDODJJUHVVLRQ  
x Show Y that you are upset. An angry reprimand or a display of sadness are reactions that are 
almost always available and used in many situations. 
x Anonymously show Y that someone is upset. This could be an unsigned message, a poster board 
note, etc. 
x Reason with Y. In Paper 3 we found that the most acceptable reaction tend to be to just explain 
why you think a behavior is wrong. 
x Avoid Y. This could mean averting your eyes, not talking to Y, walking away, etc. 
x Inform some authority. Depending on the situation, there may be some parent, teacher, boss, or 
other person in a supervisory position you could alert. This may lead to that person taking 
action, but also to that person changing their attitude to Y. 
x Engage an appropriate group to take collective action with respect to Y. In Papers 3 and 4 we 
found that use of informal punishment may be more acceptable if an appropriate group is 
collectively engaged. 
x Inform someone else. Many people will gossip about what someone did. This may be a way of 
GHDOLQJZLWKRQH¶VHPRWLRQV and possibly to make sure that someone else knows what happened. 
It may also lead to that person giving you advice on how to act, or even acting on their own. 
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x Make joking comment to Y. Although not studied in this dissertation, I think joking is a common 
response to behavior you disapprove of. A joke may indicate your disapproval while maintaining 
a friendly atmosphere. 
x Support Y. $OWKRXJKQRWVWXGLHGLQWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQRQHPD\UHDFWWRVRPHRQH¶VEDGEHKDYLRU
by a positive response (like a hug) as a way to improve relationships and make the other feel 
better. 
x Change your own behavior in order to give Y less reason to continue with his/her behavior. 
3HUKDSV<¶VEHKDYLRUVKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQLQIRUPDOSXQLVKPHQWRI\RX 
x &KDQJH\RXURZQEHKDYLRULQRUGHUWRPDNH<¶VEHKDYLRUPRUHGLIILFXOW 3HUKDSV<¶VEHKDYLRU
should be interpreted as an informal punishment of you! 
x Remember what Y did. It may affect how you act and feel next time Y does something. 
x Do nothing. There are so many little nuisances in the world, you cannot take action every time. 
 
Which action first comes to mind in a situation may depend on situational constraints, but also on 
individual differences. It seems likely that some people, due to some combination of personality and 
life history, are habitual avoiders whereas others are habitual reasoners, verbal punishers, jokers, etc. 
 
3.2.3 Step 3: Evaluation of the appropriateness of the suggestion action 
An impulsive individual might act according to the first idea that comes to mind without a second 
thought. However, I think actions that amount to informal punishment are typically influenced by 
various considerations that can be organized into three themes: 
,VWKHDFWLRQDQDSSURSULDWHUHDFWLRQWR<¶VEHKDYLRU" As discussed above, the appropriateness of 
an action will depend on what it is a reaction to. In a paper that just came out, we found that a fixed 
reaction (a reprimand) could be deemed as anything from strongly inappropriate to strongly 
appropriate depending on the severity of the norm violation it was a reaction to (Eriksson, Andersson, 
& Strimling, 2017). In the same paper, we found that reprimands were deemed as less appropriate if 
anger was shown²unless the norm violation was severe, in which case showing anger had no effect on 
appropriateness ratings. 
Am I in an appropriate position to take this action? A key finding in Papers 2 and 3 was that 
people care a lot about who uses informal punishment in a given situation. Specifically, it seems that 
FORVHQHVVVXSHULRULW\DQGEHLQJGLUHFWO\DIIHFWE\WKHRWKHU¶VEHKDYLRUJLYH\RXPRUHULJKWand 
obligation to use informal punishment. Moreover, you seem to have less right to use informal 
punishment if someone else is closer, or more superior, or is more affected by the behavior than you 
are. Even the presence of other individuals that are indistinguishable from you in these respects (i.e., 
peers) seemed to make it less appropriate for you to use informal punishment. I think the positional 
aspect is a very important factor in who uses informal punishment in any given situation. (It is also 
typically neglected in game theory based accounts.) 
How will Y react? A strong reason for not using informal punishment is that it may lead Y to 
retaliate instead of changing to a more approved behavior. Indeed, recall that Nikiforakis (2008) 
showed in an economic experiment how the presence of an option for counter-punishment made the 
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punishment frequency radically decrease (such that the positive effect of punishment on behavior was 
eliminated). 7RSUHGLFWZKDW<¶VUHDFWLRQLVOLNHO\WREHSHRSOHPD\XVHDQXPEHURIFXHVLQFOuding 





3.3 Directions for future research 
In this final section I briefly discuss a number of research questions that arises from or are 
informed by the model of informal punishment presented above. I am already working on some of 
these questions. 
What is the scope of the model? My model is a radical departure from game theory based theories 
of informal punishment, such as strong reciprocity theory and much other work on social norms that 
takes from granted that norms develop specifically around social dilemmas. My model is much more in 
line with the social psychological work of Chaurand and Brauer (2008) on determinants of social 
control of uncivil behavior. However, it extends that work in several ways. A key extension is my 
assumption that the target behavior does not need to be generally considered as uncivil; rather, I 
explicitly assume that the same process applies whatever the target behavior. I also assume that people 
have very wide-reaching and varying preferences IRURWKHUV¶ behavior, which would mean that my 
model has a very large scope. The validity of these assumptions is an important question for future 
research. It ties into several of the other questions below.   
:KHUHGRSUHIHUHQFHVIRURWKHUV¶EHKDYLRUFRPH from? If I am right that almost no behavior is 
completely shielded from causing disapproval in someone, how can that be? A core explanation, I 
believe, is that people have preferences for their own behavior (which is less puzzling), and that a 
feature of human psychology is that people tend to automatically translate these preferences to apply 
DOVRWRRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRU7KLVLVWKHWRSLFRIFXUUHQWUHVHDUFKLQP\JURXS 
What is uniquely human about informal punishment? 5HFDOOWKH³evolutionary puzzle of human 
FRRSHUDWLRQ´DFFRUGLQJWRVWURQJUHFLSURFLW\WKHRry (section 1.3). To the extent that informal 
punishment is a key to human cooperation, it should be interesting to examine what is uniquely 
human in my model. I believe that a uniquely human feature is exactly the capacity for assigning 
approval or disapproval to any possible behavior. Many animals punish others for infringing on their 
territory or on their resources, but they seem to have little capacity for caring about behavior that does 
not directly affect themselves, such as whether another does something good for the group.  
How universal are the rules of appropriateness? Papers 3 and 4 identified a couple of rules for the 
appropriateness of informal punishment that seem to hold in some generality. Specifically, greater 
severity tends to make informal punishment less appropriate whereas collective involvement tends to 
make informal punishment more appropriate. A former postdoc of mine just published a study that I 
helped design, which found that the same rules seem to apply also among the Turkana, a pastoralist 
tribe in Kenya (Mathew, 2017). Moreover, the same rules applied both in a situation of a social 
dilemma character and in a situation that is not a social dilemma. I also just completed a study where 
the geometric animations from Paper 4 were used to measure social perceptions of peer punishers in 
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eight countries (Eriksson et al., in press). Collectively managed peer punishment gained higher ratings 
than individually managed peer punishment in each of eight countries included in the study (Sweden, 
Netherlands, United States, Japan, China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan). So far, I know of 
no cultures where these rules of appropriateness do not hold. 
How do cultures differ in the use and appropriateness of informal punishment? Although my basic 
model of informal punishment is assumed to hold very generally, a key ingredient is the role of 
individual differences and they may translate to cultural differences. There are obviously cultural 
differences in which behaviors tend to be punished, often thought of as cultural norms of behavior. 
There may also be cultural differences in which informal punishment is used. In the abovementioned 
study (Eriksson et al., in press), we found that peer punishers using aggressive confrontation were 
clearly disapproved of in more individualistic countries (Sweden, Netherlands, United States) but not 
disapproved of in less individualistic countries (China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan), with 
Japan at an intermediate level. My interpretation of these findings is that the extent to which 
confrontational punishment is condoned PD\GHSHQGRQDFXOWXUH¶VHPSKDVLVRQLQGLYLGXDOV¶ULJKWVas 
such rights may include the right to break a social norm without being punished for it. The interaction 
between confrontational punishment and culture is important, not least because social norms seem to 
be always gradually changing and confrontational punishment is a mechanism for sustaining them. 
Cultural differences in the support of confrontational punishment may therefore influence the speed 
by which social norms change in different cultures. I am currently applying for grants to pursue this 
line of research together with several international partners. 
Can we understand why targets of informal punishment change over time? My main research 
interest lies in cultural evolution. A particularly interesting question in this field is why norms of 
behavior change over time. This question is under-explored. Indeed, many theoretical treatments of 
norms take for granted that they GRQRWFKDQJHHJE\FRQFHLYLQJRIDQRUPDVDQ³HTXLOLEULXP´
However, it is well-established that norms about hygiene and violence have exhibited mainly 
unidirectional change over a long period of time and in recent work (Strimling, de Barra & Eriksson, 
submitted) we propose an explanation for this change based on the notion of systematic differences in 
use of informal punishment. First, in line with my model, we show that both those who prefer more 
hygienic (or less violent) behavior and those who prefer the opposite are willing to use informal 
SXQLVKPHQWDJDLQVWWKH³RWKHUVLGH´6HFRQGZHVKRZWKDWWKRVHZKRSUHIHUPRUHK\JLHQLFRUOHVV
violent) behavior are more likely than those who prefer the opposite to use it. This asymmetry could 
drive norm change in one direction. This adds a new tool for those who study cultural evolution: where 
directional cultural change occurs, look for a fundamental asymmetry at the individual level. In an 
ongoing project we use the same tool to explain liberalization of moral opinions. 
To conclude, although the research presented in this dissertation was mainly motivated by 
skepticism of an influential theory of punishment, I believe it also serves as a basis for theoretical 
developments that have the potential of guiding empirical research in several novel directions. 
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